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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Supreme Court Case No. 47511

Stephen Merrill
Plaintiff,
vs.
Erik Smith
Defendant.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District,
in and for the County of Kootenai

HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES

Stephen Merrill

Erik Smith

Prose

Prose

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

Anchorage, Alaska

Coeur d'alene, Idaho
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-19-1695
Stephen Merrill
Plaintiff,
vs.
Erik Smith
Defendant.

§
§
§
§
§

Location: Kootenai County District Court
Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.
Filed on: 03/08/2019
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number: 4751 I

CASE INFORMATION

Bonds
Cash Bond $ 100.00
11/12/2019
Posted Cash
Counts: I
Cash Bond
7/5/2019
Counts: I

Case Type:

AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and HJ)

Case J0/25/2019 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

$26,800.00
Posted Cash

DAn:

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV28- I 9- I 695
Kootenai County District Court
05/23/2019
Haynes, Lansing L.

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff

Merrill, Stephen
Pro Se

Defendant

Smith, Erik

Pro Se
208-664-8 I I 5(W)
EVENTS

DATE

03/08/2019

Initiating Document - District

03/08/2019

II Complaint Filed

&

ORDERS OF THE COURT

INDEX

(Declaratory Judgment Complaint)
03/08/2019

II Summons Issued

03/08/2019

Iii Civil Case Information Sheet

04/01/2019

•

04/01/2019

ill Civil Case Information Sheet

Notice of Appearance
obo Defendant, Pro Se

for Defendant
04/15/2019

II Notice of Service

04/15/2019

'Ill Notice of Service
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-19-1695
05/01/2019

'II Answer
And Affirmative Defenses

05/02/2019

•

05/03/2019

'II objection

Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
(of Defendant's Second Set)

to Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment

05/06/2019

II Order of Disqualification - Self
Judge Meyer

05/06/2019

'II Notice
of Reassignment - Judge John Mitchell

05/07/2019

•

Motion for Entry of Default
Judgment

05/14/2019

•

Motion to Disqualify
Judge John T Mitchell by Erik Smith

05/20/2019

.Motion
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the lnterpleading of Trust Funds

05/22/2019

'II Order for Disqualification of Judge (Judicial Officer: Mitchell, John T. )
Mitchell by DA Erik Smith

05/23/2019

'II Order (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S. )
of Reassignment - Judge Lansing Haynes

05/28/2019

05/29/2019

.Objection
to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel lnterpleader

'II Notice of Hearing

05/29/2019

.Notice
Response to Status Conference Notice Form

05/29/2019

•

06/05/2019

'II Notice

Response
to Status Conference-Smith

for Scheduling Conference

06/11/2019

ll Case Summary
Judge's Notes-SC

06/12/2019

CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Smith-3() min

06/12/2019

CANCELED Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-19-1695
Vacated
06/17/2019

•

06/17/2019

t!!l Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L. )

Status Conference (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)

Status Conference
Court Reporter None
06/17/2019

•

Notice of Hearing

06/17/2019

•

Pretrial Order

07/02/2019

.Notice
Of lnterpleader

07/05/2019

Bond Posted - Cash

07/17/2019

11 Motion for Summary Judgment

07/17/2019

•

07/17/2019

.Affidavit
of Erik P. Smith

07/17/2019

.Affidavit
o/Craig Vernon

07/17/2019

.Affidavit
of Bradley Bliton

07/17/2019

'IJAffidavit
of Bradley Bliton in Response to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment

07/19/2019

•

08/01/2019

•

08/01/2019

•

08/01/2019

11Affidavit
Plaintiff's First Affidavit

08/05/2019

Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment

Motion to Compel
Motion to Vacate
Plaintiff's Motion To Vacate a Hearing/or Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment
Brief Filed

'Ill Response
to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Hearing

08/07/2019
08/09/2019

'Ill Notice of Appearance
Motion to Continue (11 :30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)
Stephen Merrill APPEARING TELEPHON/CALLY907-952-/200
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-19-1695
08/09/2019

'II Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)
Motion to Continue
Court Reporter Val Nunemacher

08/14/2019

08/14/2019

Motion for Summary Judgment (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)
Smith STEPHEN MERRILL TELEPHONIC 907-952-1200

'II Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L. )
MSJ
Court Reporter Val Nunemacher

08/16/2019

'II Notice of Hearing

08/29/2019

'II Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defs MSJ

09/04/2019
09/04/2019

09/06/2019

'II Judgment (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L. )
Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)
Comment (In Favor of Defendant)

11 Transcript Filed
Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript

09/10/2019

11 Motion for Reconsideration
on Summary Judgment

09/10/2019

•

09/10/2019

ti Notice of Hearing

Brief Filed
Brief on Motion/or Reconsideration

for Motion/or Reconsideration

10/01/2019

CANCELED Motion for Summary Judgment (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)
Vacated
and Motion to Compel, Merrill

10/01/2019

Motion for Reconsideration (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)
Merrill, appearing telephonically 907-952-1200

10/01/2019

'II Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)
Motion to Reconsider
Court Reporter Val Nunemacher

10/02/2019

'II Notice of Appearance
Another Notice of Appearance

10/04/2019

•

10/16/2019

'II Transcript Filed

Order (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L. )
Denying Motion/or Reconsideration

of Motion for Reconsideration
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-19-1695
10/25/2019
10/25/2019
11/04/2019

11/12/2019

'II Notice of Appeal
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
.Order
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal
Bond Posted - Cash

11/12/2019

.Notice
Plaintiff's Notice of Compliance

11/22/2019

'IJorder
Reinstating Appeal

02/18/2020

. . CANCELED Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Haynes, Lansing L.)
Vacated
3days

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Smith, Erik
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/16/2019

136.00
136.00
0.00

Plaintiff Merrill, Stephen
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/16/2019

353.00
353.00
0.00

Defendant Smith, Erik
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 12/16/2019

26,800.00

Plaintiff Merrill, Stephen
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 12/16/2019

100.00
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Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Alaska State Bar# 0911058
Boardwalk Office Suites
201 Barrow Street, Suite 103
Anchorage, Alaska 99501

STATE OF IO AHO
}ss
t:OU~TY GF !<.JOiENAI

nu::::=

2019 H~.R-8 A·H11 : 41

3::P

Tel. 907 · 771 ·9900
Fax 907·771 ·9998

a ttymerrill@anchoragelawyer. us

IN THE KOOTENAI DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
STEPHEN MERRILL, Attorney

Plaintiff,

V.

ERIK SMITH, Attorney
Defendant.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT COMPLAINT
The plaintiff Stephen Merrill, Attorney, unrepresented, states the
following in support of this declaratory judgment action filed pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 10-1201 seeking a determination of the attorney fee
division for professional work performed on two suits filed in this Court.
Complaint- Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _ __

CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER
Page 7

2

1. The plaintiff is an attorney practicing law in Anchorage Alaska. My firm

was hired by Air Force soldier Bradley Bliton of Anchorage in September of
2015 to pursue compensation for injuries sustained in a traffic accident. That
accident occurred on May 18, 2015 on a rural highway in Kootenai County.
After being pushed off the highway by an intersection collision, Bliton's truck
went through three off-road-rollovers. Bliton's three separate Takata
airbags, including a ceiling air-bag, failed to deploy in his Chrysler Ram 1500
truck.
2. Sergeant Bliton's injuries at first appeared to be largely limited to .
aggravated knee pain and swelling and a spinal twist impacting primarily his
neck. However, in July 2016 Bliton was diagnosed with right-sided
Traumatic Brain Injury also. This condition was causing chronic headaches,
dizziness, confusion and short-term memory lapses that had been developing
for more than a year. Bliton's additional diagnosis at the time was also for
Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome, a frequent aspect of a TBI diagnosis.
3. Since the case was now potentially worth millions of dollars instead of one
with an approximate $25,000 settlement value, this led to the first serious
effort to seek compensation in a product liability suit from Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles and its subsidiaries.

Complaint - Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _ _ __
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4.

Despite being totaled from the traffic accident, this counsel located

Bliton's truck at a junkyard in Washington and negotiated the right have
access to the vehicle. All three Bliton airbags remained in place undeployed.
This counsel determined that rollover accidents in the Dodge Ram had
occurred previously without air bag deployment because the banging of offroad objects into the undercarriage of the truck at times caused the Takada
airbags to fail to deploy. The emergency lane at the point of the Bliton
rollovers contained large loose stone, the perfect condition for damaging the
undercarriage of the Bliton truck.
5. Bliton then hired an expert engineer in Washington to review the Bliton
truck concerning the air bags' failure to deploy. Unfortunately, his visit
mistakenly reviewed the brakes and thereby required rescheduling.
6. Before a second examination of the Bliton vehicle could be arranged, the
time for filing suit against both the driver that caused the accident, Jessica
Lee, and against Fiat Chrysler for a defective air bag system was drawing
close.
7. In early May 2017 Defendant Erik Smith Attorney of Cour d' Alene
agreed in principle with this counsel to accept working on both suits as local
co-counsel. Though the terms and phraseology of the attorney client
agreement was specifically approved by Mr. Smith, he failed to sign the two
Complaint - Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _ _ __
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agreements presented to him on 2/16/17 that are signed by the Blitons and
this counsel. (Attachments 1 and 2) This was an event that proved quite
telling for the events that followed.
8. In correspondence on the engagement it was agreed between the two
counsel the attorney fee split between the two law firms for both cases would
be in this counsel's favor, 2-1 , since I was going to do almost all of the work
for both cases and provide most or all of the finance needed for the product
liability suit.
9. Attorney Smith agreed at the outset of representation to attend the
rescheduled meeting at the junkyard 20 miles or so distant from Cour d'
Alene. That meeting was later enlarged to now include the lawyers and
engineers with Fiat Chrysler too. I would also participate in the meeting by
video link it was planned.
10. Coming right up to the expiration of the two-year limitations period for
both suits, on the last day for filing, Attorney Smith suddenly demanded that
the Blitons sign the two Complaints to be filed in addition to bearing
Attorney Smith's signature. This counsel pointed out that Complaints are
not be signed by the clients also, just by the attorney. Idaho Rule ll(a) Yet,
Attorney Smith kept with this demand on pain of not filing the two suits.
11. The Blitons then took emergency time away from work to meet Smith's

Complaint - Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _ _ __
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odd demand. On the afternoon of the filing deadline, Attorney Smith
presented the two Complaints for filing to the clerk's office. Those filings
were rejected on the spot for including the client signatures too. Smith then
had to bolt back to his office to collect properly prepared Complaints. He filed
the two suits late in the afternoon that day risking the loss of both suits due
his baseless last-minute demand.
12. When the litigation with Fiat Chrysler began seriously several months
later, Attorney Smith, by lack of reply to me, refused more than once to enter
the Pro Hae submission for my inclusion in the cases as lead counsel,
contrary to our agreement and the clients' wishes. This was despite the fact
motion work in the Fiat Chrysler drafted by this counsel was now going to be
due for filing soon. Attorney Smith in this way blocked the product liability
case from going forward ultimately lapsing into default by the plaintiff.
13. Suddenly and inexplicably, Attorney Smith wished to dismiss the
Fiat/Chrysler suit voluntarily with no compensation paid. Attorney Smith
was never able to explain a rationale for dropping the suit contrary to his
earlier promises to participate as co-counsel along the sideline. Attorney
Smith would never have been hired without his agreement to help prosecute
the Fiat Chrysler suit as well.
14. This led this counsel to find replacement local counsel for Attorney

Complaint- Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _ _ __
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Smith. A second Cour d' Alene attorney was tentatively hired as counsel for
the two suits with much more participation to be done by the new local
counsel. Therefore, there was an equal split of the contingent attorney fees
agreed to with the new local counsel.
15. Yet, Attorney Smith managed to poison that relationship in subsequent
conversations with the new counsel. With the newly hired counsel not
wishing to be involved in such a mean mess, Mr. Smith was successful in
getting him to withdraw from his agreement to accept the two cases for
Bliton. I then began looking again for substitute Idaho local counsel.
16. In a phone conversation with me, Attorney Smith also refused to
participate in the meeting with Chrysler Fiat at the junkyard, again
demanding the suit be dropped instead. I then agreed to handle the meeting
by myself by physically going to the junkyard in Washington to review the
Bliton truck.
17. This counsel also continued to work with Fiat Chrysler's counsel retained
for its defense in what was proving to be a very valuable suit. Bliton's
lifelong brain damage was clearly related to the rollovers as a practical
matter and it was already known that these Takada air bags tended to fail to
deploy in off-road rollover accidents. Fiat Chrysler had already fixed the
defective design of the Dodge Ram air bag system to stem the failure to

Complaint - Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _

_

_

_
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deploy in rollovers.
18. Yet, before the meeting for examining the Bliton truck could happen, Mr.
Smith managed, in undisclosed conversations with Bliton, to get the client to
agree to simply drop the Fiat Chrysler s uit. Mr. Smith also managed to sign a
new attorney client agreement with the client for the traffic accident lawsuit
only, taking the opportunity then to increase the contingent attorney fee to
40%. This left me out of the case now and unable generally to communicate
further with Bliton to save the Fiat/Chrysler suit.
19. The client was in no mental condition to withstand the pleas of Mr.
Smith to simply drop the suit even though the suit promised to provide t he
client a much-needed secure financial future. The GEICO policy limits in the
traffic accident suit provided for only $100,000 in coverage for bodily injury
liability.
20. In a much later phone call from Bliton trying to get paid his settlement
figure, he acknowledged that he grudgingly dropped the Fiat/Chrysler suit
because he "could not take the risk of losing both suits because the lawyers
could not agree on things".
21. Bliton finally consulted with the private physicians I had helped arrange
for him to consult with through his new Veteran's Administration benefits.
That was not possible while Bliton was on active-duty with the Air Force.
Presumably, then the new Bliton physician confirmed the causal connection
Com plaint - Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _

_ __
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between the rollover accident and Bliton's TBI/PTSD. GEICO therefore gave
up its settlement position voluntarily, then agreeing to pay its policy limits, I
am told.
22. Mr. Smith just two weeks ago arranged for the dismissal of the traffic
accident suit while knowing this attorney-fee division petition was about to
be filed. Bliton v. Lee, CV· 17· 3881 The dismissal of the Bliton traffic
accident suit has required the filing of this additional suit.
23. As of now to my knowledge, Mr. Smith has been paid all of the attorney
fee proceeds, $40,000, with 67% of the fee to be held in trust as a condition of
the issuance of the check by GEICO, $26,800. Mr. Smith has declined to
confirm this gross attorney figure after being asked in writing to do so three
different times.
24. As of this writing, Mr. Smith informs that he is urging Bliton to resolve
this fee division matter with the Alaska Bar Association mediation services
without the assistance of counsel, even though this controversy is between
the attorneys only and the money is held in trust in Idaho.
25. The Bliton vs. Fiat Chrysler suit was dismissed ultimately for essent ially
failure to prosecute by Bliton. Case No. : CV·l 7·3880
26. Bliton has a further U nderins ured Motorists claim for his brain injury
under his old USAA auto policy. By prevailing on one legal question, Bliton
would, in effect, automatically receive a further $60,000 payment.
Complaint - Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _

_

_

_
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27. Attorney Smith though spurns this further Idaho-based claim, telling
Bliton to seek other counsel or to handle the claim on his own.
28. The time this counsel spent on professional work on the Bliton suits was
certainly a large multiple of the time spent by Attorney Smith, though Mr.
Smith has so far declined to provide the details of his work as requested, as I
ah-eady have. It appears there was no courthouse litigation after I left the

Bliton vs. Lee traffic accident suit, just the exchange of medical records and
letters with GEICO and their counsel apparently.
29. Attorney Smith should gain no advantage from his destructive
machinations described above that greatly harmed the interests of a disabled
client and also betrayed the lead counsel who hired him.
30. Trial by jury is hereby requested. Idaho Code Section I0-1209
THEREFORE, the plaintiff moves this honorable Court for entry of a
Declaratory Judgment determining that the distribution of the Bradley
Bliton attorney-fee to be $26,800 for the plaintiff herein and $13,200 for the
defendant herein, together with the award of costs in this suit.
As further procedural relief, the plaintiff seeks the alleged lien amount

of $26,800 to be interpleaded by Attorne
pending the resolution of this sui

Unrepresented
Complaint - Merrill vs. Smith, Case No. _ __

_
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ATTORNEY/CLIENT
CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT
Both STEPHEN MERRILL, ATTORNEY of Anchorage, Alaska and
ERIK SMITH, ATTORNEY of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho ("Law Finns") are
hereby retained by BRADLEY BLITON and his wife SHANNON BLITON
{"Clients") to pursue legal actions the Clients may have against FIAT
CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES, NV AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES {THE
DEFENDANTS") in a personal injury suit arising from physical injury due
to a traffic accident occurring in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho on 5 / 18/ 15.
The fee to the Law Firms shall be Thirty Three Percent and 1 / 3
percent (33-1/3%) of any amount recovered should a settlement be
reached prior to a trial. The fee shall increase to forty percent {40%) once
a trial begins.
No attorney fee shall apply in the event there is no financial
recovery.
This agreement does not cover attorney's fees connected with the
appeal of a trial verdict.
The division of the attorney fees paid between the Law Firms shall
be determined by the Law Firms in their separate agreement.
The Client shall make the ultimate decision on whether or not to
accept a settlement offer. The Law Firms shall decide how best to
present the case.
The Client will pay all necessary costs and expenses incurred in
connection with litigation arising from such claim. These costs may
include but are not necessarily limited to medical record copies, cost of
instituting suit and serving process, court reporting fees and
consultation fees charged by expert witnesses, including physicians and
travel expense.
The Law Firms, in their discretion, may advance costs as
necessary to keep the case ongoing. Such expenses incurred by the Law
Finns, if any, are reimbursable to the Law Firm by the Client. In the
event the Law Firm has advanced costs in excess of $1,500 not
reimbursed by the Client by the time of the payment of a settlement or a
trial verdict, the attorney fee payable shall be 40% of the amount
recovered instead of 33 / 1 / 3%

Page 16

The Client hereby authorizes the Law Firms to turn all incidentrelated information over to the defendants' insurer and attorneys in order
to negotiate a settlement of the claims or to prepare the case for court.

sTEP~
Dated:

ERIK SMITH~ATTORNEY

Dated:

S /lt:z,;lz

Dated:

- - - - -- - -

2
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ATTORNEY/CLIENT
CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT
Both STEPHEN MERRILL, ATTORNEY of Anchorage, Alaska and
ERIK SMITH, ATTORNEY of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho tLaw Firms") are
hereby retained by BRADLEY BLITON and his wife SHANNON BLITON
("Clients") to pursue legal actions the Clients may have against JESSICA
LEE (THE DEFENDANT") in a personal injury suit arising from physical
injury due to a traffic accident occurring in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho on
5/18/ 15.
The fee to the Law Firms shall be Thirty Three Percent and 1/ 3
percent (33-1/3%) of any amount recovered should a settlement be
reached prior to a trial. The fee shall increase to forty percent (40%) once
a trial begins.
No attorney fee shall apply in the event there is no financial
recovery.
This agreement does not cover attorney's fees connected with the
appeal of a trial verdict.
The division of the attorney fees paid between the Law Firms shall
be determined by the Law Firms in their separate agreement.
The Client shall make the ultimate decision on whether or not to
accept a settlement offer. The Law Finns shall decide how best to
present the case.
The Client will pay all necessary costs and expenses incurred in
connection with litigation arising from such claim. These costs may
include but are not necessarily limited to medical record copies, cost of
instituting suit and serving process, court reporting fees and
consultation fees charged by expert witnesses, including physicians and
travel expense.
The Law Firms, in their discretion, may advance costs as
necessary to keep the case ongoing. Such expenses incurred by the Law
Firms, if any, are reimbursable to the Law Firm by the Client. In the
event the Law Firm has advanced costs in excess of $1,500 not
reimbursed by the Client by the time of the payment of a settlement or a
trial verdict, the attorney fee payable shall be 40% of the amount
recovered instead of 33/ 1/3%
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The Client hereby authorizes the Law Finns to tum all in cidentrelated information over to the defendants' insurer and attorneys in order
to negotiate a settlement of the claims or to prepare the case for court.

L~&t:
BRAYUTON

Dated:

S/;?/do; 7

Dated:

ERIK SMITH, ATTORN EY

Dated:

s/;?/17

Dated:

- -- - - -- -

2
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Electronically Filed
5/1/2019 11 :21 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Janlyn Cleveland, Deputy Clerk

ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC
435 W. Hanley Avenue, Ste. 101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Telephone: (208) 664-8115
Facsimile:
(208) 664-6338
ISBN 5008

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STEPHEN MERRILL,

CV28-19-1695

Plaintiff,

ANSWER AND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

vs.
ERIK P. SMITH,

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, ERIK P. SMITH, pro se, and in
response to Plaintiff's "Declaratory Judgment Complaint" filed herein, answers, denies,
and affirmatively states as follows:
GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant denies each and every allegation not expressly and specifically
admitted in this Answer to Plaintiff's "Declaratory Judgment Complaint". The paragraph
numbers in this Answer correspond to the paragraph numbers in the Plaintiff's
"Declaratory Judgment Complaint".
1.

Regarding Paragraph 1, Defendant admits the accident occurred.
denies that Bradley Bliton's airbags failed to deploy.

Defendant

Defendant is without

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Page 20

information or belief to answer or deny the remaining allegations contained in
Paragraph 1, and therefore denies same.
2.

Regarding Paragraph 2, Defendant is without information or belief to admit or
deny the paragraph, and therefore denies same.

3.

Regarding Paragraph 3, Defendant denies the allegations.

4.

Regarding Paragraph 4, Defendant is without information or belief to admit or
deny the allegations, and therefore denies same.

5.

Regarding Paragraph 5, Defendant is without information or belief to admit or
deny the allegations, and therefore denies same.

6.

Regarding Paragraph 6, Defendant is without information or belief to admit or
deny the allegation, and therefore denies same.

7.

Regarding Paragraph 7, Defendant admits to commencing work on the Bliton
case in 2017.

Defendant denies the remaining allegations contained in

Paragraph 7.
8.

Regarding Paragraph 8, Defendant denies the allegations and affirmatively
states that any correspondence should speak for itself.

9.

Regarding Paragraph 9, Defendant denies the allegations.

10.

Regarding Paragraph 10, Defendant admits he was contacted by Plaintiff very
near the end of the two-year period for the Statue of Limitations, and admits that
he insisted the clients review and sign their verified Complaint.

Defendant

denies the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 10.
11.

Regarding Paragraph 11, Defendant denies the allegations.

12.

Regarding Paragraph 12, Defendant affirmatively states the request was only
provided for the first time shortly before Defendant's decision to terminate the

2

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
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relationship with Plaintiff and to withdraw from the Bliton case. Defendant denies
the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 12.
13.

Regarding Paragraph 13, Defendant denies the allegations.

14.

Regarding Paragraph 14, Defendant is without information or belief to admit or
deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 14, and therefore denies same.

15.

Regarding Paragraph 15, Defendant denies the allegations.

16.

Regarding Paragraph 16, Defendant without information or belief to admit or
deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 16, and therefore denies same.

17.

Regarding Paragraph 17, Defendant without information or belief to admit or
deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 16, and therefore denies same.

18.

Regarding Paragraph 18, Defendant denies the allegations.

19.

Regarding Paragraph 19, Defendant admits to an eventual discovery of the
actual policy limits, but Defendant denies the remaining allegations contained in
Paragraph 19.

20.

Regarding Paragraph 20, Defendant without information or belief to admit or
deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 20, and therefore denies same.

21.

Regarding Paragraph 21, Defendant denies that the Plaintiff was authorized to
be involved at that time, having previously been terminated by the client.
Defendant denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 21.

22.

Regarding Paragraph 22, Defendant admits that Bonner County case, Bliton v.
Lee, CV-2017-3881, was resolved, and denies the remaining allegations.

23.

Regarding Paragraph 23, Defendant denies the allegations as to the fee
proceeds, and is without information or belief to admit or deny the remaining
allegations, and therefore denies same.

3
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24.

Regarding Paragraph 24, Defendant without information or belief to admit or
deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 24, and therefore denies same.

25.

Regarding Paragraph 25, Defendant denies the allegations.

26.

Regarding Paragraph 26, Defendant denies the allegations.

27.

Regarding Paragraph 27, Defendant denies the allegations.

28.

Regarding Paragraph 28, Defendant denies the allegations.

29.

Regarding Paragraph 29, Defendant denies the allegations.

30.

Regarding Paragraph 30, Defendant is without sufficient information or belief to
corroborate the claim to the right to trial by jury in this matter, and therefore
denies same.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. Plaintiff's "Declaratory Judgment Complaint" fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.
2. Plaintiff's "Declaratory Judgment Complaint" fails to state an actual issue of
controversy between the parties.
3. Plaintiff has failed to allege a meeting of the minds as to all material elements
sufficient to form a contract.
4. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to plead all necessary elements of a contract.
5. Defendant asserts that solely due to Plaintiff's actions, he was terminated as an

attorney by the mutual client the Blitons, therefore any alleged contract plead herein
was also terminated.
6. There is a failure or insufficiency of consideration to support Plaintiff's claims.
7. Defendant reserves the right to assert any additional defenses that are supported
4
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by information or facts obtained through discovery or other means during this case
and expressly reserves the right to amend his Answer to assert such additional
affirmative defenses in the future.
8. Defendant has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery in this matter, and by
failing to assert any affirmative defenses, the Defendant does not intend to waive
any such defenses and specifically reserves the right to amend this Answer to
assert any additional defenses to which it may be entitled to under the law,
including case law, statutes, and rules which apply to the claims asserted by the
Plaintiff.

DATED this pt day of May, 2019.

/s/ Erik P. Smith
ERIK P. SMITH, Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was:

Li Hand Delivered
Li Mailed, postage prepaid thereon
[~ Emailed
to the following interested party on this 1st day of May, 2019:
Stephen Merrill
Pro Se Plaintiff
Email: attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us

/s/ Llewellyn Kennedy
Llewellyn Kennedy
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Electronically Filed
7/17/2019 3:31 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Tiffany Wade, Deputy Clerk

ERIK P. SMITH, esmith@lclattorneys.com
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC
435 W. Hanley Avenue, Ste. 101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Telephone: (208) 664-8115
Facsimile:
(208) 664-6338
ISBN 5008

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STEPHEN MERRILL,

CASE NO. CV28-19-1695
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs

ERIK P. SMITH,

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, ERIK P. SMITH from the law firm of
Lake City Law Group PLLC, pro se, and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
moves this Court for an Order for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Declaratory
Judgment Complaint on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
This Motion is based upon the supporting Affidavits and the Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed herewith, as well as the pleadings and
records on file herein.
Should the Court deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in whole or in
part, Defendant requests, as an alternative, that the Court enter an Order, pursuant to

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), specifying which facts appear without substantial
controversy.
The Defendant requests the right to present oral argument, testimony and
evidence and to cross-examine the other party, their witnesses and affiants at any
hearing hereon.

DATED this a a -ay of July, 2019.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / ~y of July, 2019, a true and complete copy of the
foregoing was electronically mailed to the following:
Stephen Merrill
Plaintiff
Email: attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us
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Electronically Filed
7/17/2019 3:31 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Tiffany Wade, Deputy Clerk

ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC
435 Hanley Street, Suite 101
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
Telephone (208) 664-8115
Facsimile (208) 664-6338
ISBN 5008
ISBN 9916
Pro Se Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STEPHEN MERRILL,

CASE NO. CV28-19-1695

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF BRADLEY
BLITON

vs.
ERIK P. SMITH,

Defendant.

STATE OF ALASKA
Borough of Anchorage

)
) ss.
)

I, BRADLEY BLITON, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state that:
1.

I am a former client of the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter, and a

current client of the Defendant, in a personal injury action arising from my motor vehicle
accident.

2.

In May of 2015 I was driving across country for my new Air Force posting

in Alaska. While I was in Idaho, Kootenai County, I was involved in a rollover motor
vehicle accident in May of 2015, and was injured ("MVA").
AFFIDAVIT OF BRADLEY BLITON -1
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3.

Later that year I hired Alaska attorney Stephen Merrill ("Mr. Merrill") to

represent me.

I chose Mr. Merrill because he said he had dealt with manufacturer

defects and product liability cases before, and my airbags had not deployed in the
accident. I signed an agreement with Mr. Merrill for a contingency fee contract. A true
and correct copy of said contract is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit
A.

4.

At first nothing really happened with Mr. Merrill, and then I was diagnosed

with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") and traumatic brain injury ("TBI") in the
Spring of 2016. At that point Mr. Merrill became more active in my case and told me
that "we could get millions."

5.

Mr. Merrill made all sorts of statements that I would be getting millions,

even tens of millions of dollars for my injuries from the motor vehicle accident, because
we would be suing Chrysler for failure of my airbags to deploy.

6.

Approximately one and a half years after the MVA, Mr. Merrill tracked

down my wrecked vehicle (which had been sold at public auction). Mr. Merrill told me
he had found an expert who specialized in vehicle accidents and determining cause.

7.

Based on my experience as a first responder with the Air Force, I knew

that the expert would have to know all the parts that had been removed from the vehicle
from the time of the accident. I told Mr. Merrill several times that a list of removed parts
had to be given to the expert. Mr. Merrill said he had gotten the list of removed parts
and provided it to the expert. Mr. Merrill told me to pay the expert $1,500 to start his
investigation, which imposed a severe financial hardship on my family at that time.
8.

The expert went and examined the vehicle and said the test was

inconclusive because the truck was missing certain parts. It was missing all four (4)
wheels and tires, and missing the brake system. The expert issued a preliminary report
AFFIDAVIT OF BRADLEY BLITON - 2
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that completely contradicted Mr. Merrill's assertions that I could make a claim for
against Chrysler. The report stated that the air bags were not located laterally and that
the front air bags should not have deployed in the kind of accident I was involved in.

9.

Mr. Merrill said the expert examined the wrong thing, said that he was

incompetent, and said I had to pay another expert to do another investigation. I refused
to get a new expert until I had a clear answer on who was responsible for the first
inconclusive test. I know the expert is still owed money.
10.

I was very upset at Mr. Merrill that he had dropped the ball on this, and

that he was blaming the expert for something that Mr. Merrill should have anticipated.
never got a clear answer from Mr. Merrill on what happened, or why, with the expert.
11.

I obtained medical records myself from the Air Force for my treatment of

the injuries and symptoms I experienced. Sometimes I had to drop off records at Mr.
Merrill's house because he would tell me he had to get things from me at the last minute
and needed them instantly. I was unhappy with the way he seemed to delay things until
it was almost too late.
12.

Mr. Merrill delayed the filing of my case until right before the statute of

limitations would have expired, but he kept running into problems with the Idaho court
system and would tell me how stupid it was.
13.

Mr. Merrill tried to get a local Idaho attorney but none of them would work

with him, so he asked me to call a few of them to get them interested in my case.
14.

I thought Mr. Merrill's request was strange and concerning, but I called two

or three attorneys. One of them said they would not work with Mr. Merrill because he
was unprofessional, and I recall the attorney said "I don't know what this guy is thinking,
what he plans to get out of this case."

I also spoke with attorney Erik P. Smith ("Mr.

Smith") and he said I had a case, although he was reluctant to take it on because of his
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concerns about Mr. Merrill, but eventually Mr. Smith said he would represent me as
local counsel.
15.

Mr. Merrill messed up the name of the Defendant in the Kootenai County

case against the Chrysler Corporation, by failing to properly research the correct party
for the suit. He then served the wrong party not just once, but repeatedly.
16.

The accumulation of all the delays, errors, oversights and missteps, as

well as the overblown claims by Mr. Merrill, caused my wife and I much stress, and
caused me to lose confidence in him.
17.

In November, 2017 Mr. Smith, told me he was withdrawing as my

attorney, and I needed to get a new Idaho attorney. His reasons were the difficulty in
working with Mr. Merrill and Mr. Smith's concerns with how Mr. Merrill was handling the
case.
18.

I asked Mr. Smith if he would he stay on the case if Mr. Merrill was just a

middle man and Mr. Smith take the lead. Mr. Smith said he needed to think about it,
and then a few days later told me he just did not want to work with Mr. Merrill at all, but
would help find another Idaho lawyer.
19.

Mr. Smith did not ask me to fire Mr. Merrill. Mr. Smith did not tell me that I

would lose my cases if I continued with Mr. Merrill's representation. Mr. Smith only said
he wasn't willing to represent me with Mr. Merrill because of Mr. Merrill's behavior.

20.

I asked Mr. Smith if he would continue representing me if Mr. Merrill was

no longer my attorney. When he agreed, that is when I terminated Mr. Merrill.
21.

I never spoke with attorney Craig Vernon.

22.

I fired Mr. Merrill in November, 2017 due to his incompetence, delays,

unreasonable representations, my concerns and frustration over how he handled my
case, and due to my confidence in Mr. Smith.
AFFIDAVIT OF BRADLEY BLITON - 4
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23.

My decision to terminate Mr. Merrill was not prompted by Mr. Smith, it was

my own decision.

The decision was in part due to Mr. Merrill's long term delay in

prosecuting my case.
24.

I chose the attorney I felt was best for my case, it was my own decision

and there was no pressure or coercion from Mr. Smith to terminate Mr. Merrill.

25.

Mr. Smith and his office have regularly communicated with me and

accomplished each task I asked of them.

Mr. Smith has been straight forward and

direct with me, and I have had no issues with the professionalism and competence of
Mr. Smith and his office.
/j!j

Jut1t,

DATED this_!!}_ day of~. 2019.

STATE OF ALASKA
County of Anchorage

)
) ss.
)

Junes-

On this ~day o f ~ 2019, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for the State, personally appeared BRADLEY BLITON, known or identified to me to be
the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the date last
above written.

NOTARY PUBLIC

SAVANNAH N. MELENDEZ

STATE OF ALASKA

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES March 14, 2022

A_.

"'

A'.'.l""71~:--

~{~

Notary Public for Alaska
Residing at /vt,00
Commission expiresl,C

~"f,!!_r.
l.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the Ff'"'aay of~
2019, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Stephen Merrill
Attorney at Law
Email: attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us

□
□

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
□ FACSIMILE
0 ELECTRONIC MAIL

Isl Llewellyn Kenned y
Llewellyn Kennedy
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Electronically Filed
7/17/2019 3:31 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Tiffany Wade, Deputy Clerk

ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC
435 Hanley Street, Suite 101
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
Telephone (208) 664-8115
Facsimile (208) 664-6338
ISBN 5008
ISBN 9916
Pro Se Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STEPHEN MERRILL,

CASE NO. CV28-19-1695

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF BRADLEY
BLITON IN RESPONSE TO
COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

vs.
ERIK P. SMITH,

Defendant.

STATE OF ALASKA
Borough of Anchorage

)
) ss.
)

I, BRADLEY BLITON, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state that:

1.

I am a former client of the Plaintiff, STEPHEN MERRILL ("Mr. Merrill") in

the above-entitled matter, and a current client of the Defendant, ERIK P. SMITH ("Mr.
Smith") in a personal injury action arising from my motor vehicle accident.
2.

I have reviewed the Declaratory Judgment Complaint ("Complaint") filed

by Mr. Merrill in this matter on March 8, 2019.
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3.

I make this Affidavit in response to the assertions found in that Complaint.

4.

Regarding Paragraph 1 of the Complaint, I did initially hire Mr. Merrill.

dispute the other assertions, and I deny that my vehicle had a ceiling airbag.
5.

Regarding Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, it is true that I retained and paid

an expert engineer to review my truck. However I disagree that he made any mistakes.
He was poorly instructed by Mr. Merrill.

6.

Regarding Paragraph 11 of the Complaint, Mr. Merrill is mistaken, I did not

take emergency time away from work in order to sign the complaint for my cause of
action.
7.

Regarding Paragraph 15 of the Complaint, yes my wife and I did in fact

terminate our agreement with Mr. Merrill on December 5, 2017.

Mr. Smith did not

poison my relationship with Mr. Merrill. Mr. Smith only said he could not work with Mr.
Merrill and would help me get another Idaho attorney. I had grown tired of Mr. Merril's
delays, unrealistic expectations, and difficulty in dealing with others. My wife and I made
the decision to terminate Mr. Merrill. I decided in conjunction with terminating attorney
Mr. Merrill to hire Mr. Smith solely for my cases. I did not work with Mr. Merrill any time
after December 5, 2017.

8.

Regarding Paragraph 19 of the Complaint, with my wife and I were healthy

and of sound mind when we made our decision to terminate Mr. Merrill. I stand by our
decision.

9.

Regarding Paragraph 20 of the Complaint, I admit that I called Mr. Merrill

in 2019 because he was again delaying the settlement of my case with Geico, and
neither Mr. Smith nor the Geico attorney could talk sense into him. I deny that I made
the statement attributed to me by Mr. Merrill.
AFFIDAVIT OF BRADLEY BLITON IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
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10.

Regarding Paragraph 21 of the Complaint, I consulted with my physicians

without any assistance or referral from Mr. Merrill. Regarding the Geico settlement, they
did not immediately agree to settle, and in fact we went through several motions, the
exchange of large amounts of discovery, trial preparation, and the eventual settlement
on the eve of the pre-trial.
11.

Regarding Paragraph 26 of the Complaint, Mr. Merrill repeatedly assured

me that I could file an uninsured motorist claim in Alaska. My research and consultation
with more than one attorney revealed thatthis is not true, and Mr. Merrill is mistaken.

12.

Mr. Smith satisfactorily paid the settlement funds to my wife and I. I am

happy with his services.

DATED this

.

&I!
Ju..t<?

_}j_ day of. . . 2019.

STATE OF ALASKA
County of Anchorage

)
) ss.
} p..

On this /&/~day of ~2019, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for the State, personally appeared BRADLEY BLITON, known or identified to me to be
the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the date last
above written.

NOTARY PUBLIC
SAVANNAH N. MELENDEZ

STATE OF ALASKA
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES March 14, 2022

~
Jfd,oo

~-<<lJb
Pr.

Residing at
Cen~eld
Commission expires a3Jµ.j.J-2021...
.. .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the .fl1'ay of~
19, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Stephen Merrill
Attorney at Law
Email: attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us

□
□
□
@

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
ELECTRONIC MAIL

Isl Llewellyn Kennedy
Llewellyn Kennedy

AFFIDAVIT OF BRADLEY BLITON IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

-4
Page 38

Electronically Filed
7/19/2019 1:30 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Tiffany Wade, Deputy Clerk

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Alaska State Bar# 0911058
Board walk Office Suites
201 Barrow Street, Suite 103
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Tel. 907·771 ·9900
Fax 800-585·1463

attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us

IN THE KOOTENAI DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
STEPHEN MERRILL, Attorney

Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-28·19·1695

V.

ERIK SMITH, Attorney
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST MOTION TO COMPEL

The plaintiff attorney, unrepresented, states the following in support of
his motion.
1. Defendant Attorney Smith has replied to a first set of discovery. Few of

the discovery requests though are answered in a complete, adequate way.
1
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(Attachment 1) Each numbered paragraph in this motion addresses each
deficient discovery answer.
2. Interrogatory 2 asks why the Bliton suit against Fiat Chrysler was
dismissed voluntarily without litigation. No answer is given. Several spurious
objections are made. The one objection with marginal merit on its face pleads
a "work product" privilege.
Thinking this through though, the work product doctrine does not apply to
this subsequent suit at all given that the underlying litigation is now
resolved. There are no tactical benefits to protect with imposing the privilege
in this later suit concerning a lien amount. In this suit, examining the
quantity and quality of attorney work product is a central issue to litigate.
3. Interrogatory 3 asks why Smith refused to attend the truck examination
near Cour d'Alene for Bliton. No answer is given. Wholly spurious
objections are made: vague, overbroad, burdensome, "mental impressions".
None merit discussion here.
4. Interrogatory 4 asks why the facts of Bliton's rollover with three air-bags
failing to deploy did not justify further investigation and, why, if Smith was
not going to work on the case, did Smith accept the suit in the first place. No
answer is given. Wholly spurious objections are made: vague, opinion,
overbroad, burdensome, "mental impressions". None merit discussion here.
2
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5.

Interrogatory 5 asks why Smith arranged with Bliton, outside of my

knowledge, to release me as lead counsel in both suits.

No answer is given.

Wholly spurious objections are made: vague, opinion, overbroad, burdensome,
"mental impressions". None merit discussion here.
6. Interrogatory 6 asks why Smith should not be bound by his agreement
with me concerning the attorney fee split in both suits. No substantial
answer is given. Wholly spurious objections are made: vague, opinion,
overbroad, burdensome, "mental impressions". None merit discussion here.
The one responsive partial answer to the interrogatory stated that "the
anticipated quality and quantity of work performed by Plaintiff was
inadequate". This is not an answer at all though, without adding a complete
statement of the supporting facts for this conclusion.
7. Interrogatory 7 asks how many jury trials Smith has participated in
concerning personal injury. No answer is given. Wholly spurious objections
are made: overbroad and burdensome.
Attorney Smith's trial experience in personal injury litigation is key to
assessing not only the value of his work product, but also possibly his reasons
for refusing to go forward with the Bliton suit against Fiat Chrysler.
8. Interrogatory 8 asks how many jury trials Smith has participated in
concerning any subject. No answer is given. Wholly spurious objections are

3
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made: overbroad and burdensome.
Attorney Smith's trial experience in general is key to assessing not only the
value of his work product, but also possibly his reasons for refusing to go
forward with the Bliton suit against Fiat Chrysler.
9. Interrogatory 9 asks Smith to fully describe his work in the Bliton traffic
accident suit, some of the central evidence relevant to this suit. No answer is
given. Wholly spurious objections are made: vague, overbroad, burdensome,
harassing(?). None merit discussion here.
10. Interrogatory 10 asks what experience Smith has in product liability
litigation. No answer is given. Wholly spurious objections are made:
overbroad and burdensome.
Attorney Smith's experience in product liability cases is key to assessing not
only the value of his work product, but also possibly his reasons for refusing
to go forward with the Bliton suit against Fiat Chrysler.
11. Interrogatory 11 asks what experience Smith has in traffic accident
litigation. No answer is given. Wholly spurious objections are made:
overbroad and burdensome.
Attorney Smith's experience in traffic accident cases is key to assessing not
only the value of his work product.
12. Interrogatory 12 asks Attorney Smith about his conversation with Bliton
concerning my removal as lead counsel in both suits. The objection made
4
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concerning expert witnesses(?) is incomprehensible. Attorney work product
has no application to this interrogatory. Attorney client privilege does not
apply in a situation where a litigant has two counsel supposedly working
together that results in a later suit to resolve the professional lien.
Smith does give a partial answer "No", but fails to describe the conversation
with Bliton as requested.
13. Interrogatory 13 asks Attorney Smith about his conversation with newly
retained counsel Craig Vernon concerning his entering into the two Bliton
suits as substitute local counsel. No answer is given. Wholly spurious
objections are made: overbroad and burdensome.
14. Interrogatory 21 asks Attorney Smith's understanding of how to

communicate with a severely neurologically impaired client like Bliton. No
answer 1s given. Wholly spurious objections are made: overbroad and
burdensome.
15. Request for Production 1 asks for documents related his attorney work

product for Bliton in the traffic accident suit. Wholly spurious objections are
made: overbroad and burdensome. Only an intent to possibly answer the
interrogatory at some future point is expressed.
16. Request for Production 2 asks for documents related his attorney work
product for Bliton in the product liability suit. Wholly spurious objections are
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made: overbroad and burdensome. Only an intent to possibly answer the
interrogatory at some future point is expressed.
17. Request for Production 5 and 6 and asks for copies of all written
communications with the two counsel for Chrysler Fiat. Wholly spurious
objections are made: overbroad and burdensome. Only an intent to possibly
answer the interrogatory at some future point is expressed.
18. Request for Production 9 requests a copy of the signed disbursement
statement for the Bliton traffic accident suit. No affirmative response to the
production request is offered, however Smith did provide a disbursement
statement that did not coincide with the attorney contingency fee amount set
out in Smith's agreement with Bliton.
Consequently, I asked Smith two weeks ago in writing for a jpg image of the
Bliton's settlement check as available in the bank's electronic records for
Smith's trust account. No reply has been forthcoming.
19. A draft of this motion was presented to Smith shortly after he replied to
discovery three months ago. Smith has not responded at all.
20. The statements made in this motion that fall within the personal
knowledge of this counsel are true and complete to the best of my knowledge.
21. As described above, Attorney Smith has largely refused to engage in
discovery in violation of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), thereby
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meriting the award of sanctions under Rule 37(5)(a).
Conclusion

FOR THESE REASONS, the plaintiff moves this honorable Court to
compel answers to the proffered discovery and, further, to enter an award of
$2500 in discovery sanctions for the necessity of bringing this motion.
Specifically, complete answers to the following discovery requests are
sought in this motion.
Interrogatories 2-13, 21
Requests for Production 1, 2, 5, 6, 9

Isl

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Plaintiff Unrepresented
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify a true copy of this motion will be delivered to the defendant by
the Court's electronic transmission this 18th day of July 2019 as shown
below.
Erik Smith, Attorney
Lake City Law
435 W. Hanley Ave. Suite #101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
esmith@lclattorneys.com

Isl

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Plaintiff Unrepresented
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ERIK P. SMITH, esmith@lclattorneys.com
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC
435 W. Hanley Avenue, Ste. 101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Telephone: (208) 664-8115
Facsimile:
(208) 664-6338
ISBN 5008

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STEPHEN MERRILL,

CASE NO. CV28-19-1695
Plaintiff,

vs

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
DISCOVE RY REQUESTS

ERIK P. SMITH,

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, ERIK P. SMITH, prose, and hereby
responds to Plaintiff's First Discovery Requests, as follows:
INTERROGATORIES

1. State why you declined to allow this counsel to become lead counsel in the Bliton
vs. Fiat Chrysler suit by refusing to sign the needed admission form from Idaho
counsel.

ANSWER:
Objection: This Interrogatory seeks a statement that largely
constitutes opinion versus fact, is overbroad , burdensome, seeks matters and
materials not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Defendant also objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds it is vague
and ambiguous, therefore potentially misleading , and the phrase "decline to allow
this counsel to become lead counsel" is subject to differing interpretations.
Notwithstanding and without waiving such objections, Defendant states that I first
received the Plaintiffs proposed motion on November 30, 2017. I did in fact
receive it twice on the same day. I had already communicated my inability to work
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST DISCOVERY REQUESTS - PAGE 1
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with the Plaintiff and was seeking a motion to withdraw at that time. Therefore I
was not qualified to file the motion as the prospective new Idaho counsel would be
in a better position. More importantly, concurrent with said motion, it became clear
that Plaintiff had failed to name and properly serve the correct defendant. This
was clearly the work product of Plaintiff, who had done very little legal work
previously. This mistake being jurisdictionally fatal malpractice, I thought it
imprudent to make Plaintiff lead counsel.

2. State why the 8/iton vs. Fiat Chrysler suit was dismissed voluntarily without
compensation paid or a further investigation pursued.
ANSWER: Objection: this Interrogatory seeks a statement that largely constitutes
opinion versus fact, and seeks matters and materials not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant also objects on the
grounds it is vague and ambiguous, and the phrase "further investigation pursued"
is therefore subject to differing interpretations. Defendant also objects that said
Interrogatory seeks work product which is not subject to discovery under Rule 26.

3. State what had changed, if anything, from the time you agreed to attend the
examination of the Bliton truck and the time you refused to do so. Why did you
refuse to attend the truck examination?
ANSWER: Objection: Defendant objects to this Interrogatory to the extent it seeks
the disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories
concerning this litigation and is therefore not discoverable. Objection is also made
on the grounds that said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks matters
and materials not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Additionally, said Interrogatory is vague and ambiguous and therefore
potentially misleading.

4. Please state why the failure of three airbags in a rollover collision leading to the
client's traumatic brain injury, under like circumstances where air bag failures had
already occurred with that same air bag system while off-road, is not worthy of
attorney investigation. If not, why did you accept representation of Bliton in the
Fiat Chrysler suit?
ANSWER: Objection: Defendant objects to this compound Interrogatory to the
extent it seeks the disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or
legal theories concerning this litigation and is therefore not discoverable. Objection
is also made on the grounds that said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome,
seeks matters and materials not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Additionally, this Interrogatory seeks a statement that largely
constitutes opinion versus fact.
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5. State why you arranged outside of my knowledge for Bradley Bliton to release me
as the lead counsel in the two Idaho suits he had filed. Why was I not informed of
those discussions?
ANSWER: Objection: Defendant objects to this Interrogatory to the extent it seeks
the disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories
concerning this litigation and is therefore not discoverable. Objection is also made
on the grounds that said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks matters
and materials not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Additionally, this Interrogatory seeks a statement that largely constitutes
opinion versus fact.

6. State why you should not be legally bound by the attorney agreement originally
reached between the parties concerning the attorney fee split. State any way that
I breached the agreement that we reached.
ANSWER:
Objection: This Interrogatory seeks a statement that largely
constitutes opinion versus fact. Defendant also objects on the grounds it is vague
and ambiguous, and that the phrase "agreement originally reached" is subject to
differing interpretations. Notwithstanding and without waiving such objections, the
parties herein initially negotiated without final agreement based on quantity and
quality of legal work to be performed in the future. The anticipated quality and
quantity of work performed by Plaintiff was inadequate. The Plaintiffs contingency
fee agreement was terminated by the client.

7. State how many jury trials you have participated in involving personal injury
litigation.
ANSWER: Objection: Said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks
matters and information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

8. State how many jury trials you have participated in as lead counsel concerning any
subject.
ANSWER: Objection: Said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks
matters and information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

9. Fully describe all the professional work you performed in the 8/iton vs. Lee suit,
providing the full details concerning any court appearance by you in that suit.
Provide an estimate of the hours spent broken down by category.
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ANSWER: Objection : Defendant objects to this compound Interrogatory on the
grounds it is overly broad, vague, burdensome, harassing, ambiguous and
therefore potentially misleading. Notwithstanding and without waiving such
objection, the voluminous information requested will be investigated and, if
applicable, produced at a later date.
10. Describe in detail your professional experience in litigating product liability suits.
ANSWER: Objection: Said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks
matters and information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

11. Describe in detail your professional experience in litigating traffic accident suits
alleging injuries.
ANSWER: Objection: Said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks
matters and information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

12. Did you tell Bradley Bliton that he had to let me go as lead counsel or he would
end up losing both lawsuits he filed based on your planned withdrawal from both
suits otherwise, leaving him unrepresented. Explain fully the conversation{s) on
the subject of my continued representation of Bliton.
ANSWER: Defendant objects to this compound Interrogatory to the extent it seeks
the disclosure of individuals merely contacted or consulted by him and who will not
be retained as expert witnesses, and/or the disclosure of information protected by
the attorney/client and/or work product privileges, as well as information prepared
in anticipation of litigation. Notwithstanding and without waiving such objection,
Defendant answers the first part of this compound interrogatory, "no."

13. Please fully describe your conversations with attorney Craig Vernon concerning
his replacing you as local counsel for the two Bliton suits.

ANSWER: Objection: Said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks
matters and information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
14. ls Craig Vernon an attorney reasonably capable to your knowledge of representing
Bliton in both his suits.
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ANSWER: Yes.

15.State the content of all conversations you had with Bradley and/or Shannon Bliton,
if any, about the prospect of losing Craig Vernon as their new counsel in Idaho.

ANSWER: None.

16. Why did you so often simply decline to reply to questions/requests asked of you
by me in writing?

ANSWE R: Objection: Said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks
matters and information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissib le evidence. Additionally this Interrogatory seeks a statement that largely
constitut es opinion versus fact.

17. Have you ever met Bradley Bliton in person. Have you ever spoken to one of
Bliton's physicians?

ANSWER: No.
18. Fully identify all persons you may call as a witness at the trial.
ANSWER: Mr. and Mrs. Bliton, Craig Vernon, Llewellyn Kennedy, and Darin Lang.

19. Describe fully the substance of any phone conversations with me you contend is
a probative point of evidence in this suit.

ANSWER: None.

20. Were you ever required to be somewh ere beyond your office in your representation
of Bliton?
ANSWE R: Yes.

21. Please state your understanding of how neurologically impaired Bradley Bliton was
at the time of your conversations with him concerning my dismissal as lead counsel
for him. What effect would financial intimidation from your own lawyer likely have
on someone with his mental condition at the time?
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ANSWER: Objection: Said Interrogatory is overbroad, burdensome, seeks
matters and information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

1. Provide copies of all the documents that constitute your attorney work in the Bliton
vs. Lee suit, including all court pleadings and orders written or reviewed.
REPLY: Objection: Said Request is overbroad, burdensome, seeks matters and
information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence and seeks attorney work product. Notwithstanding and without waiving
such objection, Defendant will review the voluminous documentation and
supplement this request if applicable.

2. Provide copies of all of the documents that constitute attorney work by you in the
Bliton vs. Fiat Chrysler suit, including all court pleadings and orders written or
reviewed.
REPLY: Objection: Said Request is overbroad, burdensome, seeks matters and
information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence and seeks attorney work product. Notwithstanding and without waiving
such objection, Defendant will review the voluminous documentation and
supplement this request if applicable.

3. Provide copies of all written communications with me concerning the two Bliton
suits.
REPLY: Objection: Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks
production of documents or information already in Plaintiff's possession, custody
or control.

4. Provide copies of all written communications with Craig Vernon concerning the
Bliton suits.
REPLY: None.

5. Provide copies of all written communications with the retained defense counsel
concerning the Fiat Chrysler suit, Attorney Daryl Lang.
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REPLY: Objection: Said Request is overbroad, burdensome, seeks matters and
information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence and seeks attorney work product. Notwithstanding and without waiving
such objection, Defendant will review the voluminous documentation and
supplement this request if applicable.

6. Provide copies of all written communications with the general counsel for Fiat
Chrysler concerning the Fiat Chrysler suit, Attorney Paul E. Scheidemantel.
REPLY: None.

7. Provide copies of all written communications with the retained counsel for Jessica
Lee, Attorney Charles Murphy.
REPLY: None.

8. Provide copies of all written communications with the insurer for Jessica Lee,
Allstate.
REPLY: None.

9. Provide a copy of the disbursement statement signed by the Blitons in connection
with the settlement payment by GEICO, along with a copy of their signed attorneyclient agreement with your firm.
REPLY: Objection: Said Request is overbroad, burdensome, seeks matters and
information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Defendant also objects on the grounds that said Request seeks work
product and is not subject to discovery under Rule 26. Notwithstanding and
without waiving such objections, see attached.

DATED this 15th day of April, 2019.

/s/P:rik (J). Smitfz
Erik P. Smith
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Electronically Filed
8/1/20191:16 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Janlyn Cleveland, Deputy Clerk

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Alaska State Bar# 0911058
Boardwalk Office Suites
201 Barrow Street, Suite 103
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Tel. 907-771-9900
Fax 800-585-1463

a ttymerrill@anchoragelawyer. us

IN THE KOOTENAI DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
STEPHEN MERRILL, Attorney

Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-28-19-1695

V.

ERIK SMITH, Attorney
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Attorney Smith seeks summary judgment on alternate grounds. First it
is argued there is no contract between the attorneys thereby requiring
dismissal. Alternatively, a vague plea is made for dismissal relying on
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concepts also taken from contract law. No caselaw or other legal authority is
cited in the motion, beyond the section reciting the legal standard for
summary judgment.
Oddly, no affidavit from Attorney Smith is included with the motion that
would explain the key events in the suit. The motion makes no reference at
all to the nature of the professional work Attorney Smith performed for the
client, Bradley Bliton.
The submission does include two affidavits from Bliton that concern
mostly matters unrelated to summary judgment. The content of the Bliton
affidavits is addressed in the affidavit I personally submit today in order to
make the points needed for this reply and address the scattershot criticisms
made in the motion paperwork. (Attachment 1)
All that is relevant from the Bliton affidavits for purposes of this motion
is the acknowledgment by the client that I was not terminated for "good
cause", but rather as the result of a maneuver by Attorney Smith at the very
time he was being replaced.

1

1

The submission of the Bliton affidavits is no defense to the rule of hearsay, even in summary judgment practice.
Should this motion come to a hearing, any testimony from Bliton will have to include the opportunity for crossexamination questions.
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Relevant Facts
This declaratory judgment suit seeks the enforcement of an attorney
lien for the professional fees rendered to client Bradley Bliton and his wife
Shannon in two suits that were filed in this Court in 2017, both involving the
same injury to Bradley.
One Bliton suit was against the driver at fault for the triple rollover
accident. Bliton vs. Lee (CV-l 7-3881) That suit was settled with little further
attorney work needed to be done for the Blitons after I left the suit. The
insurer GEICO paid its policy limits, $100,000, presumably shortly after
Bliton's new neurologist, one now from the private-sector, confirmed that his
traumatic brain injury was caused by the Idaho rollover accident.
The second suit filed was against the Bliton truck manufacturer for
three faulty airbags that failed to deploy leading to Bliton's traumatic brain
injury. Bliton vs. Fiat Chrysler (CV-l 7-3880) That suit was dismissed with
prejudice shortly after I was discharged and with zero recovery for the client:
something I resisted in every way I reasonably could, as explained in my
affidavit.
Though the motion states it is uncontested that there is no agreement
between the two law firms concerning a fee division, that is simply not true.
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In this suit there was an agreed fee split between the two firms made in
writing. The entire agreement of the two law firms is contained in the email
string where I hired Attorney Smith as local counsel for Bliton, not as lead or
equal counsel. (Attachment 2)
This agreement reached in writing before Attorney Smith had any
contact with Bliton called for a 2-1 split of earned attorney fees in my favor,
along with a similar division of the professional work on the suit. Nothing
changed with that agreement between the law firms through until the day I
was released by Bliton out-of-the-blue.
Not only does Attorney Smith fail to describe in his motion his work on
the two suits after I was discharged by Bliton, he also fails to provide any
such information in discovery so far.

(See the Motion to Compel Presently

Pending)
The motion further fails to state the attorney fee paid by the Blitons,
whether 40% of the recovery or 33% of the recovery. In discovery, Attorney
Smith so far also fails to produce the key proof of the attorney fee paid, the
bank check deposited by the Blitons as their settlement amount, asked for 3weeks ago. (See the Motion to Compel Presently Pending)

Legal Analysis
In by far most lienholder suits to determine an attorney fee figure from a
4
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contingency fee settlement, there is no contract between the law firms.
Typically, the client releases one firm and then hires another one unrelated
to the first firm.
In such a case, the legal standard for analysis is "quantum meruit": What
were the respective contributions made by the two law firms in achieving the
settlement? See for example Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, 141 Idaho
185, 191, 108 P.3d 332, 338 (Idaho 2005)
So, the absence of a contract argument raised by Attorney Smith in his
motion lacks all validity. This is a lien enforcement suit that does not require
a contract between the parties.
The remaining legal conclusions Attorney Smith makes in his motion
frankly fail again to recognize the nature of this suit and its basis.
A professional services lien on a personal injury recovery does not require
a continuing contract with the client or patient specifying anything. A
professional services lien attaches by operation of law once perfected by
notice.
Once an attorney is relieved by the client of further work, it is not a
breach of contract for the attorney to no longer work on the suit. The client's
decision to switch attorneys is not an end to the matter of attorney
compensation, especially with a contingency fee arrangement.
5
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So, the Smith motion has no reasonable basis at all.
But there is a directly controlling Idaho case for this suit not cited in the
motion. The Idaho Supreme Court decision reduces the issue in this suit to a
simple calculation, given the written agreements between the law firms: The
contract terms apply with a deduction against the lienholder attorney for the
time he or she was excused from working further on the case. Anderson v.

Gailey, 606 P.2d 90, 100 Idaho 796 (Idaho 1980). Also see Sullivan v.
Bullock, 864 P.2d 184, 124 Idaho 738 (Idaho 1993)
Shortly after I finally receive the statement and documentation of
Attorney Smith's efforts in the Bliton suit since my discharge, along with the
proof of the attorney fee paid by the Blitons by producing the check deposited
by the Blitons, a countervailing motion for summary judgment will be filed.
That motion should be argued together with this one, should a court hearing
prove necessary.
The statements made in this brief that concern the personal knowledge
of this counsel are true and complete to the best of my knowledge.
The plaintiff does not seek a court hearing for this motion.
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The plaintiff seeks by separate motion today to vacate the present oral
argument hearing date for this motion, August 14, 2019.
/s/

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Plaintiff Unrepresented

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify a true copy of this motion will be delivered to the parties by the Court's electronic
transmission of this motion as shown below.
Attested to this 1st day of August 2019.

Erik Smith, Attorney
Lake City Law
435 W. Hanley Ave. Suite #101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
esmith@lclattorneys.com
Stephen Merrill, Attorney
201 Barrow Street, Suite 103
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
a ttymerrill@anchoragelawyer. us
Isl

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Plaintiff Unrepresented
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From: Stephen Merrill [ mailto:attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us]

Sent: Wednesday, May 03, 2017 10:08 AM
To: office.EPSlaw@gmail.com
Subject: LOOKING FOR IDAHO CO-COUNSEL
Dear Eric,
I found your law office online. I like your web site.
Greetings from Alaska, not a letter one receives every day.
I am hoping your law firm has interest in becoming local counsel for a traffic accident suit to be filed in
Kootenai County court by my client, former Air Force Sergeant Bradley Bliton, who live here in Alaska.
I have spoken with the Idaho defense counsel for GEICO insureds, attorney Charles Murphy in Boise, and
have now decided that federal jurisdiction in Idaho is not something to be invoked for a traffic accident
suit based on diversity of citizenship. So, I need someone in northern Idaho to team on the case. The
amount of work you do on the case is largely up to you.
As you can see from the attached police report, the accident happened near Couer d'Alene. It is a case
of clear liability. The GEICO insured forced Bliton's pickup truck and trailer off the road into a rollover
and then into the adjoining ditch. Though seriously injured himself, Bliton offered key medical
assistance to the other driver before medics arrived at the scene.
The limitations period for the case expires on 5/18/17, two weeks from now. Negotiations with GEICO
have gone nowhere recently. GEICO's adjuster said they had a "big" policy limit, but GEICO still declines
to say exactly what the limit of liability coverage is.
The sticking point in negotiations is whether Bliton received a traumatic brain injury from the accident in
Idaho. Bliton has a bad case of TBI as shown by his attached Air Force neurological records. Bliton has
been given a 40% of the whole-body Veterans Administration disability rating for his TBI.
Though there are two other potential causes for Bliton's TBI, the traffic accident is the leading candidate
by far, beyond a preponderance of the evidence to me. Rollovers often cause severe head injuries.
For the past few months, after finding out in late summer of Bliton's TBI, I have been investigating a
potential Bliton suit against the pickup manufacturer, Dodge, since his air bag did not deploy thereby
making his injuries more severe. This suit is potentially worth multiple seven figures, way beyond the
GEICO policy limit, whatever it is

ATTACHMENT 2
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Now, having had an engineer examine the pickup at a Spokane junkyard, it has been decided no suit
against Dodge will be pursued. Frontal air bags are not designed to deal with rollover type accidents
well.
So, at least the Bliton suit now is going to be quite simple, aside from the medical testimony. I attach a
first draft of the state court complaint to be filed once we retain co-counsel.
Please let me know if you have interest in partnering in this suit on a contingency fee basis. Your firm
will bear no exposure to case expenses.

Sincerely,
Stephen Merrill, Attorney
http://anchoragelawyer.us

From: Erik Smith [mailto:eps1aw2009@gmail.com ]
Sent: Wednesday, May 3, 2017 3:21 PM

To: attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us
Subject: FW: LOOKING FOR IDAHO CO-COUNSEL

stephen
I can help. If you are interested I can prepare and file the complaint and effect service of the
summons in those time constraints.
what are you proposing for the fee agreement, and do I need the client's consent?
thanks,
erik
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney and Counselor at Law

From: Stephen Merrill [mailto:attymerrill@anchoraqelawyer.us]
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 7:39 AM
To: 'Erik Smith'
Cc: Bradley Bliton
Subject: LOOKING FOR IDAHO CO-COUNSEL
9
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ERIK,
Brad Bliton is very interested in your joining his case.
So am I.
Let us know how best to pay for the filing fee and costs of service. Does your office accept credit cards?
At this point in the case, we could be looking at a long campaign. GEICO could also decide rather quickly
to give up the ghost and pay policy limits. In this case there is the plaintiff's advantage where defense
counsel is an employee of the insurer, not billing by the hour.
There is no need for expert testimony on liability from either side. Brad's medical experts are going to
be in Alaska. Their testimony will have to be taken in Alaska prior to the trial.
When it comes time for depositions I cannot say if Brad will be deposed in Coeur d Alene, Boise or even
Anchorage. I can say I see no need for travel by your office.
If Jessica Lee is deposed in Coeur d. Alene, I would likely ask you to take that testimony.
We can work on discovery together.
At the trial, Brad does wish for me to be lead counsel. You would need though to attend large portions
of the trial.
So, given the work so far and the work anticipated, I suggest a split of the contingent fee to be 2-1 in
my favor, with flexibility on the number should things not develop as planned. Let me know on this
point.

I attach the attorney-client agreement I have with Brad, a 1/3 contingent fee with Brad paying the
expenses (or me if truly needed to).
What I suggest is that you draw up an agreement with your office for Brad to sign that simply says in
connection with fees that the attorneys will share the existing contingent fee on the basis they choose
divide that sum.
There is also the need for me to be admitted to practice in Idaho for this suit only. That motion can be
filed at the time the suit is filed or shortly thereafter. I will prepare the needed affidavit.
I have some questions for you too concerning UIM coverage in Idaho, but it is likely a pipe dream. Can
UIM be stacked in Idaho where, after a primary carrier with a higher limit pays in full, then the UIM
coverage picks up from dollar one?
10
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That is the law in Alaska, believe it or not. The UIM carrier even becomes the suit defendant with a
three year limitations period.
I look forward to working with your office. BEST WISHES, STEPHEN MERRILL, Atty.

From: Erik Smith [mailto:eps1aw2009@gmail.com ]
Sent: Thursday, May 4, 2017 8:31 AM

To: 'Stephen Merrill' <attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us>

Cc: 'Erik Smith' <epslaw2009@gmail.com >
Subject: RE: LOOKING FOR IDAHO CO-COUNSEL

Stephen,
I would agree with your terms, with the following suggestions. The current contingency fee
agreement should be amended to put both names on the agreement and insert an escalation
clause that if the matter goes to trial the attorneys would be entitled to a 40% share, and any
post-trial work would increase the attorney share to 45%.
I assume and agree that I will be responsible for drafting and filing the Kootenai County
complaint and summons, effectuating service, and will solely handle all of the Kootenai County
court appearances (except trial) and Kootenai county depositions.
I would agree that in the trial you will sit first chair, but I understand my presence would be
required. I do not think your a pro hoc vice will be necessary until we get closer to the trial.
I imagine the depositions of the physicians will be the most work initially. Therefore I would
agree to the 2:1 atty fee agreement you propose. However, if we go to trial I would want
to split the fee evenly thereafter.
Once we file Geico will choose an attorney here locally, and I should know who they are, and
can give some background on that particular office. There is an argument that our experts
should be deposed in Alaska, so I would notice up the physician depositions early in the
process, so they have to endure the cost and travel, or resign themselves to video deposition.
The filing fee in our county is $207 and my process server charges $65.
I would need the name, address and contact information for the defendant for service, and I
think I have enough facts from your draft complaint to get started.
regarding UIM coverage, I do not believe that is the situation in Idaho. I have never heard of
that.
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Also, FYI Idaho has a two-year statute of limitations for torts like this.
Erik
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney and Counselor at Law

From: Stephen Merrill [mailto:attymerrill@anchoraqelawyer.us]

Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 1:55 PM
To: 'Erik Smith'
Subject: RE: LOOKING FOR IDAHO CO-COUNSEL
I have not confirmed everything with the client, but here is a draft agreement for your review. SM

From: Erik Smith [mailto:epslaw2009@gmail.com ]
Sent: Friday, May 5, 2017 8:26 AM
To: 'Stephen Merrill' <attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us>
Subject: RE: LOOKING FOR IDAHO CO-COUNSEL

looks good, but why no agreement on fees for an appeal?
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney and Counselor at Law

On May 5, 2017, at 10:35 AM, Stephen Merrill <attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us> wrote:
AN AGREEMENT ON APPEAL TERMS
First, it seems to commit the lawyers to an appeal, one that might not have much merit.
It would be a miracle for GEICO to appeal a traffic accident verdict like this.
Much more likely is a bad faith suit against GEICO by their insured. Bliton could be awarded his 10m.
An appeal on our side is for an inexplicable defense verdict or a too small verdict. Or, god forbid, less
that great legal representation.
In this instance, the 45% number will give the client sticker-shock for little reason.

12

Page 65

If there is an appeal, the agreement is clear that new terms do have to be reached.
What do you think? The client has not seen this draft. SM

Ok

ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney and Counselor at Law
(Emphasis Supplied)
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Filed:08/29/2019 11:58:01
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Sverdsten, Suzi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STEPHEN MERRILL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ERIK SMITH,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV28-19-1695
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a declaratory judgment action on a purported fee-sharing agreement between
Plaintiff, an Alaska attorney, and Defendant, an Idaho attorney, regarding representation of an
Alaska resident who was injured in an Idaho vehicle accident. Defendant moves for summary
judgment based on an argument that there is no agreement between the parties upon which to
base a declaratory judgment action. Plaintiff argues that there is an agreement between the
parties as evidenced by emails between the parties regarding the representation. Plaintiff further
argues that the standard of analysis is quantum meruit, and characterizes this as a case to enforce
a lien. At the hearing, Defendant argued that Plaintiff did not plead facts supporting a claim
where quantum meruit would be a remedy. When the Court asked Plaintiff whether quantum
meruit was not alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint for declaratory judgment, Defendant argued that
Memorandum Decision and Order
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the grounds for quantum meruit were sufficiently raised by his Complaint and that he raised facts
sufficient to obtain that remedy. Plaintiff also argued that it would only take an amendment of
the Complaint to satisfy pleading requirements, and that Defendant was actually arguing that
Plaintiff failed to state a claim.
II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(a). The nonmoving party may not merely rest upon the pleadings, but must
support the assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists by citing "to particular parts of
materials in the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence ... of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
"In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 'make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."' Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 259, 245 P.3d
1009, 1012 (2011) (quoting Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)). A
motion for summary judgment will not be granted where there are unresolved issues of material
fact. McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189, 190, 595 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1979). Where reasonable
people could reach different conclusions when presented with the evidence then the motion must
be denied. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 (2007).

Memorandum Decision and Order
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III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs Complaint is titled "Declaratory Judgment Complaint."

Declaratory

Judgments are governed by the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, which authorizes declaratory
judgments, and states in relevant part:
Any person interested under a ... written contract or other writings constituting a
contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a ... contract . . . may have determined any question of construction
or validity arising under the . . . contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights,
status or other legal relations thereunder.
I.C. § 10-1202. Defendant has alleged that there is no contract to support a declaratory judgment
action because there was no meeting of the minds on all the essential terms of the purported
contract.

Plaintiff argues that the fee sharing agreement is contained in the emails between

counsel, which was attached to Plaintiffs opposition brief. However, attaching exhibits to a
brief does not authenticate those exhibits and the Court cannot consider evidence not properly
submitted. There is binding authority on this point:
Our attention is invited to certain drawings which, it is claimed, require three
inches of concrete cover instead of two inches. . . In any event, the drawings are
simply appended to Shacocass' brief. We do not see where they were presented to
the district court in a manner cognizable by Rule 56, I.R.C.P. They are not
mentioned in, or attached to, the verified complaint or affidavits ....
As noted above, Shacocass is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference
that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. Anderson v. Ethington,
supra. However, a court cannot hypothecate facts which are absent from the
record cognizable under Rule 56. Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107
Idaho 335, 337-38, 689 P.2d 227, 229-30 (Ct.App.1984); see
generally Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869, 452 P.2d
362, 366 (1969) (the court can consider only that material contained in affidavits
or depositions which is based on personal knowledge and which would be
admissible at trial).
Shacocass, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 116 Idaho 460,463, 776 P.2d 469,472 (Ct. App. 1989).

Memorandum Decision and Order
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As such, the Court cannot consider the evidence Plaintiff submitted, as it is not
admissible. Similarly, the Court cannot consider Plaintiffs representations as to the emails, as
this is prohibited by I.R.E. 1002.
I.R.C.P. 56(e) addresses situations where a party fails to support a fact, and states:

If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may:
(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials, including
the facts considered undisputed, show that the movant is entitled to it; or
(4) issue any other appropriate order.
Because Plaintiff has not submitted evidence supporting the existence of a contract with
properly authenticated, admissible evidence, the Court will exercise its discretion and grant
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with the proviso that the Court will allow Plaintiff
to properly support its factual assertions in a motion to reconsider, should Plaintiff choose to
submit one pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11.2.
Regarding Plaintiffs purported claim supporting a remedy of quantum meruit, the Court
does not find such a cause of action was pied to Idaho's notice pleading standards. Quantum
meruit is an equitable remedy for an implied in fact contract.
In a suit on an express contract for work and labor, where the work has been fully
performed and only payment pends, recovery may be had as on an
implied contract on quantum meruit if the evidence fails to show the express
contract, but does sustain an implied contract.
Cook v. Saltzer, 74 Idaho 97, 100,257 P.2d 228,229 (1953).
A party cannot file a declaratory judgment on an unjust enrichment/implied in fact
contract because I.C. 10-1202 only authorizes declaratory judgment for actual contracts, not
implied contracts.
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A contract implied in law, or quasi-contract, is not a contract at all, but an
obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity
without reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties, and, in some cases,
in spite of an agreement between the parties.

Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004) (quotations and
citation omitted).
Plaintiff has not pled a cause of action for implied in law contract pursuant to Idaho's
notice pleading standards.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure set forth a system of notice pleading intended
to free litigants from what were once rigid pleading requirements. Cook, 135
Idaho at 33, 13 P.3d at 864.
The general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide
every litigant with his or· her day in court. The rules are to be construed to
secure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. The purpose of a complaint is to inform the defendant of
the material facts upon which the plaintiff bases his action. A complaint
need only contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause
of action and a demand for relief.

Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986) (citations omitted).
Courts should "make every intendment to sustain" a complaint that contains a
"concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for
relief." Gibson v. Ada Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849
(2003).
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 751-52, 274 P.3d 1256, 1266--67 (2012) (emphasis
added).
However, there is nothing in Plaintiff's Complaint that would apprise Defendant that
Plaintiff was pursuing a claim for an implied in fact contract. The only theory of recovery
identified is declaratory judgment, the Complaint is titled "Declaratory Judgment Complaint,"
and declaratory judgments are not available on implied in fact contracts.
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Here, Brown's Complaint is not separated into multiple causes of action, and
the only theory of recovery identified is negligence. Brown's Complaint uses
the words "negligent," "negligently," and "negligence" but makes no mention of a
nuisance or taking, either specifically or through the use of operative terms
typically associated with these claims. Read as a whole, the allegations contained
in Brown's Complaint are consistent with what is expected where a cause of
action for negligence is being alleged. The prayer for relief is a generic request for
damages, not inconsistent with what might properly be requested where the sole
theory of recovery is negligence. Our liberal notice pleading standard is intended
to see justice done, and prevent the dismissal of a valid claim for a mere technical
failing. However, the opposing party must be provided with notice of the
underlying theories being pursued against them in order to adequately prepare for
trial. Our notice pleading standard requires more than a naked recitation of
facts from which a hyper-vigilant attorney could possibly foresee the
possibility of a given cause of action. A plaintiff cannot, in his complaint,
paint us a picture of a four-legged animal with fur and a tail labeled "cat"
and then assert at summary judgment that the picture depicts a dog.
Brown v. City ofPocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 809-10, 229 P .3d 1164, 1171-72 (2010) (emphasis

added). As no cause of action was pied for implied in fact contract, there is no cause of action
upon which to grant or deny summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 1s
GRANTED.

, 2019.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J.CJ

Ac,,A!jvt~J--;

I certify that on this
day of
2019, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served, with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below,
to the following person(s):

Stephen Merrill
201 Barrow St., Ste. 103
Anchorage, AK
99501

□

D
□

D
~

0
D

Ausey Robnett
435 Hanley St., Ste. 101
Coeur d'Alene, ID
83815

□

D

~

By

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
ViaFax:
E-mail: ATT'IMQ,N,I ~ u,,cbo~b,..,,)e-,<1P\

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Via Fax: (208) 664-6338
E-mail: arobnett@LCLattomeys.com

Q;, !2l'½d--,;:t'i
Deputy Clerk
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Filed:09/04/2019 08:46:41
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - McCoy, Susan

AUSEY H. ROBNETT, Ill ISB 3218
ERIK P. SMITH, ISB 5008
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC
435 Hanley Street, Suite 101
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
Telephone (208) 664-8115
Facsimile (208) 664-6338
arobnett@LCLattorneys.com
esmith@LCLattorneys.com
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CASE NO. CV28-19-1695

STEPHEN MERRILL,

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs

ERIK P. SMITH,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff dismissing Plaintiff's
Complaint with prejudice.

30 August, 2019

Signed: 8/30/2019 01:25 PM

District Judge Lansing Haynes
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4, 2019
I hereby certify that on _ September
_____
_ _ _ _ _ , a true and complete copy of
the foregoing was electronically mailed to the following:
Stephen Merrill
Plaintiff
Email: attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us

Ausey Robnett
Attorney for Defendant
Email: arobnett@lclattorneys.com

cf@am YYlcCot=
~

Deputy Clerk
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Filed:10/04/2019 14:05:25
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - McCoy, Susan

ERIK P. SMITH, ISB 5008
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC
435 Hanley Street, Suite 101
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
Telephone (208) 664-8115
Facsimile (208) 664-6338
arobnett@LCLattorneys.com
esmith@LCLattorneys.com
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CASE NO. CV28-19-1695

STEPHEN MERRILL,

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs

ERIK P. SMITH,

Defendant.

THIS MATTER coming before the Court on October 1, 2019 for hearing on
Plaintiff Motion for Reconsideration, both parties present, the Court upon hearing
argument, and considering the pleadings on file herein, and for good cause appearing,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

3 Oct., 2019

Signed: 10/3/2019 09:47 AM

District Judge Lansing Haynes
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4, 2019
I hereby certify that on _ October
____
_ _ _ _ _ _ , a true and complete copy of
the foregoing was electronically mailed to the following:
Stephen Merrill
Plaintiff
Email: attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us

Ausey Robnett
Attorney for Defendant
Email: arobnett@lclattorneys.com
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Electronically Filed
10/25/2019 11 :25 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Bobee Deglman, Deputy Clerk

1

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Alaska State Bar# 0911058
Boardwalk Office Suites
201 Barrow Street, Suite 103
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Tel. 907-771-9900
Fax 800-585-1463

a ttymerrill@anchoragelawyer. us

IN THE KOOTENAI DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
STEPHEN MERRILL, Attorney

Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-28-19-1695

V.

ERIK SMITH, Attorney
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL
TAKE NOTICE Plaintiff Stephen Merrill hereby notes his appeal of the
Final Judgment Order of the Court dated 8/30/19, made subject later to a
Motion for Reconsideration denied by the Court on 10/4/2019, the Hon.
District Judge Lansing Haynes, Presiding.
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This party has a right to appeal this suit to the Idaho Supreme Court. The
final judgment described above is an appealable order pursuant to Rule
(ll(a)(2), I.A.R.
No order has been entered in this suit sealing any portion of the court
record.
No further transcripts are being created for this appeal.
The plaintiff/appellant designates the following documents as filings to
be forwarded as part of the appeal record, along with other required filings:
1. Final Judgment Order
2. Court Order/Memorandum Granting Summary Judgment
3. Transcript of Hearing on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
4. Transcript of Hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
5. Court Order Denying the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration
6. Complaint
7. Two Contracts Between the Parties and the Client, Bradley Bliton,
Attached to the Complaint
8. Proposed First Amended Complaint
9. The Defendant's Motion Seeking Summary Judgment
10. The Defendant's Motion Brief Seeking Summary Judgment
11. The Two Affidavits of Bradley Bliton attached to the Defendant's Brief in
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Support of Summary Judgment
12. Plaintiffs Affidavit with attachments attached with his Brief Opposing
Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel
13. Email Correspondence Between the Parties Attached to the Plaintiff's
Brief Opposing Summary Judgment
14. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Replies
15. Discovery Replies attached to the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery
Replies
The issues the plaintiff intends to raise on appeal are as follows:
1. Does the remedy of declaratory judgment litigation lack jurisdiction to

adjudicate the interpretation of the rights arising out of the two attorneyclient agreements signed here by both party attorneys and the clients,
Bradley and Shannon Bliton?
2. Is it appropriate under Civil Procedure Rule 56 to rule on issues that more
properly lie under Civil Procedure Rule 12?
3. Is the Complaint filed subject to dismissal on summary judgment for not
outlining that the doctrine of "quantum meruit" is applicable in attorney lien
suits for professional services?
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4. If the Complaint was defective as ruled by the district court on summary
judgment, should the complaint have been allowed to be amended as
proposed in the First Amended Complaint filed on Reconsideration?
5. Are the party affidavit and email correspondence between the parties
"inadmissible" for purposes of a Rule 56 Summary Judgment motion?
6. Can the defects found by the district court in the plaintiffs evidence under
the Rule 56 matter support the granting of summary judgment here?
7. Did the email correspondence between the parties concerning the fee split
for the Bradley Bliton suits fail to raise a factual issue concerning the
contract basis for recovery under "quantum meruit" principles?
8. Did the selection by the district court of its own theories of law controlling
summary judgment, that were first announced at the time of decisionmaking, violate Due Process of Law?

Isl

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Plaintiff Unrepresented
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify a true copy of this notice, once distributed by the Court, will be
mailed to the parties this 25th day of October 2019 as shown below.
Erik Smith, Attorney
Lake City Law
435 W. Hanley Ave. Suite #101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
esmith@lclattorneys.com
Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Boardwalk Office Suites
201 Barrow Street, Suite 103
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
attymerrill@anchoragelawyer. us

Isl

Stephen Merrill, Attorney
Plain tiff Unrepresented
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Stephen Merrill
Plaintiff,

vs.

Supreme Court No. 47511
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Erik Smith
Defendant.
I, Bobee Deglman, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State
of Idaho in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify there were no exhibits offered for
identification or admitted into evidence during the course of this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court on this the 18th day of December, 2019.
JIM BRANNON
Clerk of the Court

By: 'Bobee
Deputy Clerk

1Je9fman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:
Stephen Merrill
Erik Smith

attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us
esmith@lclattorneys.com

[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail

Jim Brannon
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 12/18/2019

Certificate of Exhibits - D (MISC28}

By: 'BofJee

1Je9fman

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Stephen Merrill
Plaintiff,
vs.
Erik Smith
Defendant.

Supreme Court No. 47511
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO THE RECORD

I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true, full and correct record of,
the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

I do further certify that copies of all documents, charts and pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits in a trial or hearing in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record, except that
pictures or depictions of child pornography shall not be copied and sent to the parties or the
Supreme Court unless specifically ordered by the court. Documentary exhibits in pdf format
may be sent to the Supreme Court on a CD that includes an index. All other exhibits shall be
retained by the clerk of the district court as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court on this the 18th day of December, 2019.
JIM BRANNON
Clerk of the Court

By: 'Bohee
Deputy Clerk

Clerk's Certificate to the Record - D (MISC30)

Veg{man
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Stephen Merrill
Plaintiff,
vs.
Erik Smith
Defendant.

Case No. CV28-19-1695
Clerk's Certificate of Service

I, Bobee Deglman, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record
in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript (if
requested), along with copies of Dall Exhibits offered or admitted;

IZI No Exhibits submitted;

D Pre-sentence Investigation, or D Other Confidential Documents; or D Confidential Exhibits
(if applicable) to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on December 18, 2019, I served a copy of the attached to:

Stephen Merrill

attymerri Il@anchoragelawyer.us

[X] By E-mail

Erik Smith

esm ith@lclattorneys.com

[X] By E-mail

Clerk's Certificate of Service - Revised 07/01/2018
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